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t sounds like a big idea – a League of 
Democracies. Europeans will naturally 
be interested in the question. But is it 
sound? 
The idea of an official organisation of 
democratic states wishing to promote 
democracy worldwide has surfaced 
periodically in recent years. In 2000 the Community of 
Democracies was inaugurated and survives as a body 
committed to supporting democratic change (and we 
comment on this little-noticed initiative further below). 
Now the notion is gaining further currency. US 
Presidential candidate John McCain has advocated a 
League of Democracies. And analyst Robert Kagan, an 
advisor to McCain, has recently made a contribution on 
the subject in the Financial Times.
1 It is quite possible 
that the European Union will need to adopt a position 
on this proposal.  
The various backers of the idea seem to have very 
different things in mind, ranging from a combative 
intent to join geo-political battle with the autocrats and 
bypass the UN Security Council with forceful 
interventions whenever there is a blockage there 
(McCain & Kagan), through to those who seem to want 
a softer but allied and more vigorous democracy 
promotion initiative.
2 
Some basic objections to the combative geo-political 
concept promptly came forward in response to Kagan, 
which may be summarised as follows:
3 
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o  With the current Bush administration now branded 
at the geo-political level by the Iraq disaster, and at 
the level of individual human rights by Abu Ghraib, 
Guantanamo and its refusal to join the International 
Criminal Court, any next Republican 
administration might better spend a few years in a 
state of contrition repairing the US brand first. 
o  Any proposal smacking of an interventionist UN-
bypass organisation (i.e. as a mechanism to give 
legitimacy to actions that cannot pass the UN 
Security Council) will be seen as an act to sideline 
and further weaken that body, and meet widespread 
European objections, as well as from other old 
democracies such as Australia and Canada, and 
even more so with leading democracies of the third 
world such as Brazil and India. 
o  The technical and political question of which 
countries would be sufficiently democratic to be 
admitted would be intractable, with the continuum 
in grey shades between the black and white 
accounting for most of the world’s 200 states. Mr 
Kagan recommends using the EU’s criteria, but that 
would mean a very restricted club, with little 
representation from the third world. (Moreover the 
EU’s entry criteria are themselves less objective 
and more subject to political haggling than Kagan 
seems to suppose). 
o  If the objective is to induce more grey countries to 
become whiter, would membership of such an 
organisation be a sufficient incentive to make a 
difference? No incentive seems conceivable that 
would be analogous to the EU accession process 
that has driven Central and South-Eastern Europe 
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to transform their polities into democracies. The 
World Bank and the US Millennium Fund already 
grant substantial ‘governance-conditional’ aid. 
It is true the global democratisation movement, which 
spurted ahead in post-Communist Europe, has reversed 
in Russia and seems at best to have stalled in other 
continents.
4 This is both an analytical challenge for 
political scientists and a diplomatic challenge for those 
working on expansion of the democratic sphere. New 
elements in the landscape include the ‘smarter 
authoritarianism’, Russia’s ideological offensive under 
the banner of ‘sovereign democracy’ and China’s aid 
and investment packages such as in Africa undercutting 
the attempted conditionality of Western donors. 
Missing the point 
But a League of Democracies is not the answer to this 
‘democracy rollback’. New efforts internationally to 
coordinate democracy support would be welcome. But 
it is not clear that a new organisational structure would 
address the real problems that currently beset 
democracy promotion. 
For a start, the League of Democracies risks replicating 
and cutting across the Community of Democracies. 
Founded in 2000 at the initiative of the United States 
and Poland, this body now has over 100 member 
governments and recently held its fourth ministerial 
meeting in Bamako, Mali. However the Community of 
Democracies has suffered from precisely the set of 
problems outlined above. Its impact has been limited 
and the organisation has not become a prominent player 
either in terms of pro-democracy diplomacy or through 
on-the-ground political reform initiatives. Negotiations 
over membership criteria have been highly fractious; 
127 states were invited to Bamako but disagreements 
continued over whether some countries (for example 
Venezuela and Iraq) should be allowed in. As Annex A 
shows, of 192 countries surveyed by Freedom House, 
88 are considered free, 60 partly free, and 44 not free. 
How should the partly free be treated? It is not clear in 
what way the League would be sufficiently different so 
as to avoid these problems. At best, institutional 
confusion would reign. 
The main problems impinging upon the effectiveness of 
current democracy promotion efforts are two-fold. 
First, in both the US and Europe the political will to 
prioritise support for democracy has weakened. In 
Europe many see the US intent on ‘imposing 
democracy by force’: in fact the problem with US 
policy is more often that it combines bombastic pro-
democracy rhetoric with a shift back towards realist 
alliance-building in practice. Both the US and EU 
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would do better to give some real substance to the 
structures they have already have in place rather than 
create a new big-bang initiative that would risk very 
soon turning out to be as hollow as the Community of 
Democracies. The need is to bolster existing 
institutional structures, rather than create new ones. 
The second main problem is that donors now struggle 
to know how best to spend democracy assistance funds. 
Most donors provide a standard mix of democracy 
programmes covering civil society, elections, 
governance reforms, parliaments, parties, local 
government, judicial reform, media freedom, women’s 
rights and security sector reform. But the results have 
invariably been limited. Again it is not clear how 
creating a new high-profile diplomatic club would 
actually address the need to reassess democracy-
building strategies on the ground. Indeed, if anything, it 
is likely to deflect the focus away from what would be 
far more useful: low-profile and incremental efforts 
aimed at increasing the impact of monies already spent 
on democracy and human rights.  
If the League is about excluding non-democracies from 
a norms-based club, it is not clear how this would 
benefit the democracy agenda. If it is designed to be a 
central mechanism to coalesce democracy funding, it 
would be better to pursue this in a low-profile manner 
through other existing institutions. If it is supposed 
primarily to provide an ‘incentive’ to reform for those 
excluded, it may well prove more of a disincentive: 
most democracies in the developing world are 
themselves not keen on external support for their 
democracy promotion efforts. 
Boosting existing institutions  
Rather than create a new, US-led, highly politicized 
initiative, it would be much better to strengthen 
international coordination through existing multilateral 
and regional bodies. 
The UN’s mandate to support democracy has been 
narrow and the rules governing funding from the UN 
Democracy Fund highly restrictive. But a commitment 
does exist to improve the UN’s work on democracy 
assistance and diplomatic efforts should concentrate on 
modestly widening the scope of the UN’s work in this 
area.  
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) has a highly relevant 
membership for the present topic. Beyond Europe, it 
includes Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea 
and Mexico. It has accession talks and roadmaps with 
Chile Israel and Russia, and ‘enhanced engagement’ 
with Brazil, China, India and South Africa. Although 
economic in mission, it has so far confined its 
membership to advanced economies that are also  
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democratic, hesitating still over the admission of 
Russia.  
The OECD has a Development Assistance Committee, 
which reviews members’ aid policies and third world 
development trends. The OECD could be invited to 
create a Democracy Development Committee, which 
could review the democracy promotion activities of its 
member states, and draw up analyses and guidelines for 
democracy transition processes. It would assemble 
handbooks on advanced democratic practice. There is 
no shortage of political science text books, nor indeed 
of benchmark monitoring of democracy in the world 
such as the Freedom House rankings, World Bank 
governance indicators, Transparency International’s 
corruption rankings, etc. The OECD would not have to 
reinvent the wheel. However there is no equivalent to 
the OECD’s work on economic policy in the domain of 
political constitutions and democratic practice. An 
initial branching out of the OECD into ‘democracy’ in 
this way, which might follow classic OECD methods 
(professionally competent and respected peer review), 
could in due course if the business flourished lead to a 
renaming and branding of the OECD into the OECDD, 
with the additional letter standing for democracy.  
The experience and instruments of the Council of 
Europe should also be looked at. Membership is subject 
to political conditionality, but this is less demanding 
than for EU accession. The credible intention to 
become democratic is the main test. Belarus is the only 
European country still refused admission, and Russia’s 
increasingly authoritarian regime has met with criticism 
but not expulsion. There is a parliamentary assembly 
that takes up issues of democratic failings in member 
states. A major requirement is to accede to the Council 
of Europe’s Conventions on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, and to accept the jurisdiction 
of the European Court of Human Rights of Strasbourg, 
which are serious political and operational 
commitments. However the Court’s workings are now 
encumbered with a huge number of Russian cases, and 
Russia blocks functional reforms of the Court intended 
to remedy this problem.  
The Council of Europe, which suffers from problems of 
obsolescence in relation to the enlarging EU and 
globalisation, could provide a basis on which to build. 
It could host a new branch of activity for global 
activities. One evolutionary technique would be to open 
a ‘window’ for non-European countries to become 
involved in typical Council of Europe activity. There 
could be accession to the Human Rights Conventions, 
which are similar to but more developed than the UN 
Universal Code of Human Rights, and acceptance of 
the jurisdiction of the Court of Human Rights (or have 
an associated Court for associated states). In addition 
the Council of Europe has in the last two decades 
quietly done valuable professional work with its new 
member states on constitutional matters (with support 
from the Venice Commission), on the organisation and 
modernisation of judiciaries and penal systems, local 
government democracy, etc. It assembles ad hoc groups 
of experts and officials from the old and new 
democracies of Europe to pursue such issues in an 
atmosphere of professionalism without political 
polemic. It should be noted that while Russia is 
currently a ‘politically difficult’ member state of the 
Council of Europe, this has not impeded continuing 
activity that has a more professional and technical 
character in Russia itself in many fields such as the 
examples already quoted. Such activity could well be 
extended to a wider set of countries beyond Europe. 
Criteria for inclusion in such programmes would be 
based on the seriousness of intent of the applicant, 
which might in some cases for certain periods be quite 
sector-specific (e.g. on constitutional matters, aspects 
of the judiciary, etc.). A more ambitious variant would 
be to open the Council of Europe to applications for 
associate members from outside Europe. 
The most striking strength of the Council of Europe 
system is that all its member states have accepted the 
supreme jurisdiction of the Court of Human Rights, and 
even Russia has so far accepted to implement the 
several judgements handed down against its 
government. A striking weakness in the case put 
forward by the United States for a strong world 
democracy and human rights regime has been its own 
refusal to allow international courts to have any 
jurisdiction at home. What if Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib 
and the ‘extraordinary rendition’ of Al Qaida suspects 
had been subject to the jurisdiction of international 
courts?  
NATO represents itself as a military alliance of 
democracies. While traditionally confined to the 
transatlantic sphere, NATO now reaches out into other 
continents through a variety of dialogue and partnership 
activities: Mediterranean countries have a Dialogue 
with NATO and in the Gulf NATO interacts through its 
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. NATO is also seeking 
ways in engaging increasingly with democratic nations 
such as Australia, Japan and South Korea although 
there is opposition within NATO to turning links with 
these ‘contact countries’ into ‘global partnerships’. 
Closer to home, NATO pursues security cooperation 
and dialogue with all non-member states of the Euro-
Atlantic area: most intensely through the politically-
conditioned enlargement process through Membership 
Action Plans, while the Partnership for Peace 
programme extends defence reform assistance to others 
from Belarus to Central Asia.  
The (former British) Commonwealth is a further model 
to bear in mind. Membership criteria have been fairly 
accommodating, and only the most egregious regimes 
are sanctioned. South Africa was outcast during 
apartheid, but is now a highly respected member. 
Zimbabwe has been a long saga of difficulty in getting  
4 | Michael Emerson & Richard Youngs 
unanimous to support it, or to refuse its attendance at 
annual meetings. Pakistan has been pushed out and 
come back in. Annual meetings adopt declarations, and 
economic sanctions have been adopted on occasion. 
Mediation and advisory missions are organised. A key 
quality is the balance between the old democracies 
(Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK), India as the 
huge new democracy, South Africa as a model for its 
continent, and the many other struggling members. It is 
demonstrably an inclusive organisation with many 
weak and hardly democratic states, and in this respect 
can be regarded as a sub-set of the UN. It organises 
advisory functions and on occasion mediation missions. 
In the politico-military domain one may also bear in 
mind the excellent niche activity of the Swiss-led 
organisation for Democratic Control of the Armed 
Forces (DCAF), based in Geneva, which has 50 
member states, including Russia, Ukraine, Nigeria, 
Indonesia, South Africa and Cote d’Ivoire.  
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (IDEA) is a Swedish-led intergovernmental 
organisation, based in Stockholm, aiming to provide 
knowledge to democracy-builders and support 
democratic reform. It has 25 member states, including 
Botswana, Chile, Costa Rica, Ghana, India, Mexico and 
South Africa, as well as many European countries. 
In post-Soviet Europe, Georgia and Ukraine took the 
lead in starting up the Community of Democratic 
Choice (CDC). Based on Georgia and Ukraine, this 
receives the encouragement of the US and several new 
EU member states, but hardly from the EU as such. It 
has been an attempt to consolidate the achievements of 
the Rose and Orange Revolutions, but has never really 
clarified its functions beyond meetings of political 
leaders and declarations, and loses credibility due to the 
failure of the Rose and Orange revolutions to have 
matured as well-functioning democracies.  
These are some of the organisations that have some 
momentum of democracy work that could be enhanced. 
It is worth noting that all the major organisations cited 
above blend their concern for democracy with other 
vital functions of government: OECD with a linkage to 
economic policy, Council of Europe with a linkage to 
human rights law, and NATO with a linkage to security 
and defence. Given that these are well-established and 
respected organisations that bring benefits from their 
core functions, a concerted deepening of their linkages 
to democratic development looks like a more plausible 
and worthy approach than creating a new organisation. 
On the other hand it is observed that Russia has used its 
membership of the OSCE to try to diminish this 
organisation’s role in matters of democracy and human 
rights; and as mentioned above it has been working in a 
similar direction in a less high-profile manner in the 
Council of Europe. For these reasons there should be 
careful policies, notably in the OECD, to deepen 
existing engagement with the major countries such as 
Russia and China, while conditioning full membership 
on a democracy criterion. The same argument should 
apply to NATO. Engagement policies are entirely 
possible without handing a veto card in the governing 
councils of these organisations to the non-member 
partner states. But for this desirable engagement 
process to advance, it is necessary for the ‘democrats’ 
to manage their relations with the ‘not-yet democrats’ 
is a mutually respectful manner, rather than as part of a 
policy of ideological and geo-political confrontation. 
This point is the major objection to the apparent spirit 
and intent of Robert Kagan’s argument.  
A further important objective would be to gain some 
commitment to democracy from those bodies that have 
so far eschewed any notable support for democratic 
reforms. Despite having a Democracy Charter, the 
Organization of American States is still dominated by 
the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs 
of its members, demonstrated in particular by the cases 
of Venezuela and Cuba. ASEAN has become a little 
more outspoken on the case of Burma, but still 
essentially steers clear of politics. And the Southern 
African Development Community’s caution has been 
laid bare in Zimbabwe’s on-going saga.  
Both the US and EU must invest greater effort in 
motivating and pressing such regional bodies to support 
democratic change. In the future, it is likely that 
Western powers will have less of a direct impact on 
political change in many parts of the world and will 
need to exercise what influence they retain in indirect 
fashion through the multilateral and regional bodies 
that could make more of a difference in some of the 
most intractably autocratic states.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, there is a fundamental difference 
between two types of conceivable activity: 
-  To organise collective geo-political power of the 
old and new democracies to counter the new non-
democratic powers and 
-  To work to strengthen democracy worldwide, and 
democracy promotion policies. 
These two activities could overlap in practice, but there 
is still the question whether the large majority of the 
old and new democracies would want to do both. It is 
likely that a large majority of the old democracies 
outside the US and the new democracies of the third 
world will not want to go down the first track, which 
may therefore be labelled the ‘bad idea’, but could well 
be interested in renewed efforts down the second track.  
At a general level of political philosophy there is 
unease, to say the least, outside the US with the long-
established American trait to cast world politics into  
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black and white: the free or the not free, the terrorist or 
the non-terrorist, the good or the evil, those ‘for’ us or 
‘against’, etc. While these diametrics seem to be 
instinctively distrusted in Europe, the misgivings have 
been amply reinforced by the experiences of recent 
years with policies aimed at the ‘axis of evil’ and the 
‘war against terror’.  
On the other hand a fresh effort to give greater 
international institutional support for democratisation 
worldwide is both conceivable and desirable. The 
various examples quoted suggest that a concerted shift 
in priorities in favour of democracy could be 
engineered in multiple international organisations and 
national agencies. It is the nature of democracy that its 
dynamics should thrive on many movements and 
centres of initiative. Three major international 
organisations – OECD, Council of Europe and NATO – 
could lead a careful further development or re-
calibration of their activities to support democracy 
development more actively through engagement with 
non-member states that have (or could have) 
associative arrangements with them. Precautionary 
policies should also restrict enlarged membership to 
democracies, to prevent the watering down of pro-
democracy policies such as has recently been illustrated 
by Russia’s role in the OSCE.  
One can observe different parties in the US adopting 
symbolically different language on current ideas in 
circulation, with different authors proposing either a 
‘League’ or a ‘Concert’ of democracies.
5 We for our 
part argue against a new organisation, but do advocate a 
strengthened concertation among relevant existing 
international organisations and seriously interested 
national governments to move pro-actively for 
democratic progress worldwide. 
We would prefer to see the United States taking a low-
profile but consistent position in favour of democracy; 
it should eschew ‘grandstanding’ new initiatives at the 
level of high politics, and rather focus on giving real 
substance to the plethora of commitments it has already 
made. We would equally like to see the EU adopt a 
higher-profile position, which could mean meeting the 
US ‘halfway’ in a useful convergence. The EU for its 
part certainly needs to demonstrate its political will to 
make existing institutions work to promote democracy 
– something that it has failed to do in recent years.  
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Annex A: Rankings of political freedoms 
by Freedom House 
1.  Free 
Andorra, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, 
Belgium, Belize, Bulgaria, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, 
Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Dominica, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, 
Greece, Grenada, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia, Nauru, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Panama, 
Poland, Portugal, St Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, San 
Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Tuvalu, United Kingdom, United States, 
Uruguay (58) 
2.  Free 
Antigua, Argentina, Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Croatia, 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guyana, India, 
Indonesia, Jamaica, Latvia, Lesotho, Mali, Mexico, 
Monaco, Mongolia, Namibia, Peru, Romania, Saint 
Vincent and Grenadines, Samoa, San Tome and Principe, 
Senegal, South Africa, Suriname, Taiwan, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Vanuatu (30) 
3.  Partly free 
Albania, Bolivia, Colombia, East Timor, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Liberia, Macedonia, Moldova, 
Montenegro, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Papua New 
Guinea, Paraguay, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, 
Turkey, Ukraine, Zambia (22) 
4.  Partly free 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Comoros, Georgia, 
Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kenya, Kuwait, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Philippines, 
Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Venezuela (18) 
5.  Partly free 
Afghanistan, Armenia, Bahrein, Bangladesh, Burkino 
Faso, Central African Republic, Congo (Kinshasa), 
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gambia, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Nepal, Singapore, Togo, Tonga, Uganda, 
Yemen (20) 
6.  Not free 
Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, 
Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), Egypt, Fiji, Gabon, 
Guinea, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Maldives, North Korea, 
Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Rwanda, Tadjikistan, 
Thailand, United Arab Emirates (24)  
7.  Not free 
Belarus, Burma, Chad, China, Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba, 
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Laos, Libya, Saudi Arabia, 
Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Zimbabwe (20) 
Totals: free 88, partly free 60, not free 44; all countries 
192 
Source: Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2008”, 
(http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw08launch
/FIW08Tables.pdf).  
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